Be that as it may, the doctrine of emptiness for imprecision has recently been criticized because it has no basis in the Constitution. In two cases in the past five years, Justice Thomas has held that the doctrine of emptiness for imprecision derives entirely from early cases that have legal ambiguity rather than vagueness.  Although no definition can fully capture the distinction, vague laws can be considered as such without fixed and recognizable meaning, while ambiguous laws are those that have a finite number – often two, but sometimes more – of possible meanings.  The difference is crucial because no one has claimed that ambiguous laws violate due process principles. The first cases, Judge Thomas argued, present applications of the leniency rule according to which criminal laws must be interpreted strictly.  But the leniency rule applies only to criminal laws and, more importantly, is simply a rule of interpretation, not constitutional law, and can be repealed by legislation. According to Thomas J.A., the doctrine of emptiness for imprecision has as little constitutional legitimacy as the idea of “substantial due process” and involves the same danger that unelected judges will decide on an ad hoc basis which legislative acts go too far and should be removed.  Gorsuch J. has recently set about defending the doctrine of emptiness for vagueness as a good constitutional right for originalist reasons.  However, he wrongly argued that the concept of due process notice, which has always been understood as requiring clarity on fee instruments, also requires clarity in legislation. But it was only the previous year that the Court upheld a similar law against an indeterminate challenge.
In Bandini Petroleum Co. v. In New Jersey, the court struck down a law declaring it criminal for a person with at least three previous criminal convictions who had “not practised a legal profession” to be a member of a “gang of two or more persons.”  The court subsequently removed provisions that criminalized behaving, as previously mentioned, in a manner that was “annoying” to passers-by, being “without visible or lawful business” in public,” or failing to provide “credible and reliable” identification at the request of a police officer.  Finally, some laws that have been attacked so vague have as their only defect an extensive transfer of legislative powers without accompanying it with a vagueness. The disputed status in Shuttlesworth v. The city of Birmingham falls into this category. The relevant part of the law stated: “He should […] be illegal for a person to stand on or loitle around a street or sidewalk. after a police officer asked him to continue.  Before concluding that the law had been restricted to accommodate constitutional objections, the Court noted that “the constitutional flaw of such a broad provision does not need to be demonstrated” because it means that “a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the discretion of a police officer.”  But this “constitutional vice” has nothing to do with imprecision: every term (except perhaps “loiter” that could easily be eliminated) is perfectly clear.  Nevertheless, the Court of First Instance declared the regulation invalid on the basis of an argument that could have been extracted from any of its modern cases of nullity for vagness.
 The following explanation of the doctrine of nullity for imprecision was given by Sutherland J. in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): Even stranger, given the fundamental concern of non-delegation reasoning, the Court held that guidelines issued by an administrative or enforcement authority that clarify otherwise vague legal formulations may protect a law from being retained. unconstitutionally vague.  The Court made this proposal at the outset of its jurisprudence on the nullity of imprecision. In Champlin Refining Co.c. Corporation Commission, the Court considered legislation that “prohibits the production of crude oil or petroleum.” .